The subject of this article is the reinscription of a new diaspora in the public sphere by which governments and multilateral institutions are mobilizing. The following argues that these kinds of mobilizations have had the effect of subverting traditional approaches to diasporic linkage that in African and African American studies have privileged trans-Atlantic slavery and its consequent social dislocations and led to the marginalization of other forced and voluntary diasporic linkages. As this article argues, one such movement often excluded from popular diasporic theories in the Black Atlantic region represents new types of economic linkages being deployed alongside various UN stakeholders and members of business communities of the Global South. These formations carry the mission of developing concrete goals to end global poverty through eradicating war and developing new diasporic projects that will accelerate economic growth in the South. The author calls for a rethinking of the contemporary processes that are at play in diasporic invocations of a post-9/11 period and shows how the call for nationals abroad to invest in their “home” countries is being used to create new diasporic linkages. In this regard, the article introduces the notion of humanitarian diasporas in an effort to rethink trans-Atlantic slavery as the central basis for conceptualizing the starting place of African diasporic theorizing in the North American Academy.

**KEYWORDS:** humanitarian diasporas, transnational mobilizations, rethinking diaspora

**SPECTERS OF LOSS: RETHINKING THE FICTION OF DIASPORA**

The concept of “diaspora” continues to be among the most controversial and evolving for scholars today. The journal *Diaspora*, edited by Khachig Töloöyan, which had a wide and successful circulation for over a decade, identified the term in relation to its larger semantic domain, including such words as “immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (Töloöyan 1991:5;1996). *Philosophia Africana: Analysis of Philosophy and Issues in Africa and the Diaspora*, founded in 2001 and edited by philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, explored “pluralistic experiences of Africa and the Black Diaspora from both universal and comparative points of view,” fostering interdisciplinarity and intellectual engagements with African-descended communities. Both leading journals, international in scope and engagement, have elicited original and critical pieces that further interpellate diasporic traditions of thought.

Over the past decade, a range of publishers have supported the 21st century emergence of new, relevant themes that update the scholarship of diaspora studies, reinstating use of the word, and broadening its terms of inclusion in order to problematize its binary conception of origins and sites of dispersal. In these articulations, scholars have extended the terrain of African American and Africana studies by creating a widening field of engagement that makes the Africa in “African American” present. Many scholars of black Atlantic theorizing have moved away from the language of diaspora and to instead articulate the linkage between and movement of people and things across various national states as transnational (Brown 2005; Clarke 2007; Holsey 2007; Olupona 2008; Zeleza 2005). Some are rethinking the relevance of diaspora in contexts that insist on the political and economic hierarchies at play (Axel 2004; Clarke and Thomas 2006; Edwards 2003; Van Hear 1998). And many others have introduced new metaphors for exploring black Atlantic ties such as circum Atlantic linkages (Roach 1996), and Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993; Thompson, 1984), Black Atlantic dialogs (Codrington 2006; Matory 2005; Yelvington 2001) and diasporic identification as politics (Gordon and Anderson 1999; Zeleza 2006). At the same time, various powerful corporations, funding agencies, United Nations (UN) think tanks and powerful international bodies interested in the future of economies from the Global South have also begun to take notice of the diversity of diasporic formations and the powerful economic realities that their alliances produce. In places throughout Africa,
Latin America, and the Caribbean as well as Asia, remittances being sent home on a regular basis constitute the making of diasporic linkages between hometown regions and cities and towns in the North (Naim 2002; Newland 2004).

Yet, in the midst of all this rethinking, a parallel revival of the language of diaspora has been promulgated in the black world by new public institutional agents of change. African activists, NGO and humanitarian workers, donors, and state functionaries whose formation diverges from that of popular black Atlantic ontologies, these agents are laying claim to black diasporic language that engages a new ontology of diaspora quite different from that of the modernity of Western trans-Atlantic slavery. This new ontology underscores the formation of a postcoloniality in particular African states in which a global capitalist permissiveness underlies ongoing resource wars, and where there exists an exponential rise in more human fatalities that the past century has seen since the second world war.

Within this context, I want to reevaluate the centrality of both trans-Atlantic slavery and race as the single most important problem of the West in the 20th century, in order to detach and reattach a new ontology of sub-Saharan Africa in crisis to African America. In the 21st century, it is not only the color line that summons our urgent attention, but also the crisis of death and global complicity to live and let die. The dilemma of various weakened African state polities whose significant economic and political decisions are brokered outside of the country with international donors and institutions, must be seen alongside diasporic survivors of slavery in the Americas whose ontological formation emerged from a pre-Westphalian order. Yet while this comparative evaluation points to the central divergence of relationships in transition, it insufficiently addresses their pressing need for analytic attention.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the after effects of structural adjustment, in addition to the liberalization of trade and struggle over resources, are leading to a rise in the military industrial complex in which death from civil wars and the debilitating of Africa’s states have all contributed to poverty, unrest, and conflict in the African postcolony. A range of African-based programs has been developed alongside those in the international community to produce new economic opportunities between various African business people and their diasporic counterparts abroad. Yet interestingly, while these innovative programs are being implemented in the name of diaspora, large numbers of scholars of African American anthropology, sociology, and of Africana and/or African American studies programs throughout the United States have been slow to reframe the study of diasporic formations so as to detail the different ways that the language of diaspora is being articulated in the contemporary present. Rather, academic scholarship on black American social life has disproportionately studied the “African diaspora” through the prism of particular identity, religion, music, and performance in which the most recent shift has involved the exploration of Afro-Atlantic “dialogues” highlighting mutual engagements with histories of slavery among those of the contemporary circum-Atlantic region (cf. Scott 1991; Yelvington 2006).

A result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, among other processes, created the potential for a worldwide black “community,” and that which has more recently been created through the post-World War II, and especially post-1965, proliferation of transnational migration (Pierre 2006; Thomas 2004; Trouillot 2003), what is needed today more than ever is a scholarly agenda committed to rethinking the category of the black diaspora—including the specificities of migration, transnational travel, and refugeeism that are part of its context—but that also includes the realities of militarization, poverty, exile, and death that are central to sub-Saharan African histories and contemporary networks.

**DIASPORIC HUMANITARIANISM**

The plunder of Africa used to build Europe and North America along with its system of racial exclusion is being redirected and is producing a new diasporic subject in Africa and beyond. A response to this dynamic is the emergence of a new movement. This formation, which I call “diasporic humanitarianism,” reflects new collaborations between those of the Global South with institutions of international power whose mission is tied to the protection of human rights, the eradication of poverty, and the related protection of victims. Early humanitarian ideas were certainly at the heart of legitimizing slavery and subsequent colonial encounters and over time these forms of humanitarianism have both produced the condition for the eradication of slavery as well as the condition for the maintenance of new forms of inequality (see also de Waal 2007; Fadlalla 2008, 2009; Mamdani 2009). To understand this new emergence of diasporic humanitarianism, its rhetoric, purpose, and institutional power is to recognize the ways that new global nodes of economic interconnections, trade liberalization, and international institutions have significantly restructured the workings of the nation-state and the politics of race and development. For what we are seeing is that in...
efforts to take action against human disasters, in the places such as the Sudan, DRC, and Uganda, among others, various agents are collaborating with powerful governing brokers to make claims against those who dare withhold their democratic freedoms.

Behind the expansion of a “new diaspora” engaged in the work of transnational community building and linkage is a growing deployment of mass international trade, with migrant groups in home communities and sites of settlement. Yet even in sub-Saharan Africa, where some of the poorest communities reside, trade income from oil, cocoa, minerals, diamonds, and other natural resources is fostering a widening gap between rich and poor, as well as the production of far-reaching, neoliberal trade relations. These reconstructions of trade are dependent on the implementation of particular international treaty agreements as well as established democratic stability and the rule of law.

The entrepreneurial engagements of various Chinese, Israeli, Lebanese, Indian, Taiwanese, Mexican, and Gulf State immigrants have produced key investors in various markets; but increasingly significant is the historical absence of widespread large scale African investors in African economies. Of late, new UN-based programs are engaging U.S.-African immigrant groups to participate in venture-financed and, in some cases, UN-supported high-growth business models engaged in various high-technology forms and the building of economic ties in culturally related constituencies.

Although the ties they carry with them are essential, the reality is that these transnational community-making moves actually reflect fictions of linkage, specters of African diasporic formations, in which the ontological presence of different cultural alliances are made real through the political mobilization of community. In other words, such alliance building has a real presence in the world, but these alliances themselves are not real in an ontological sense. In the Save Darfur movement, the beckoning for the Darfuran diaspora and the international community for coalition support actually reflects a call for an embodied subject whose presence is known through their signature or their donation. This mobilization of a diasporic elite is key to understanding the way that these new linkages are being mobilized through class alliances.

At the forefront of the specter of this diasporic alliance is the UN, which has been working with various stakeholders to develop the following UN Millennium Development Goals to end global poverty: “(1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieve universal primary education; (3) Promote gender equality and empower women; (4) Reduce child mortality; (5) Improve maternal health; (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) Ensure environmental sustainability; (8) Develop a global partnership for development.”

Addressing, in particular, the eighth of the Millennium Development Goals, the UN has initiated partnerships throughout the Global South with various professionals—investors, policy makers, and state leaders who are part of the annual G-8 summits—to put in place possibilities for “capacity building.” For example, the UN’s Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Task Force has launched three Digital Diaspora Networks: one for Africa (DDN-A), another for the Caribbean (DDN-C), and the Digital Diaspora Network for Latin America. In the case of the DDN-A, African professionals living outside of the continent are put in conversation with African entrepreneurs so that ICT initiatives in their home regions may be used to develop thousands of Internet nodes and digital activities. Such UN alliances have the concomitant benefit of fostering the political engagement of expatriates. And while its terminology and usefulness is of ongoing debate, the Goal’s targeted area of redress, refugeeism—the separation of family members from other members, consequent forced movement and displacement—remains among the most pressing phenomena of our time.

Heralded as the contemporary answer to Africa’s problems, however, international adjudication, diasporic alliance, and multilateral intervention are exterior solutions, mobilizations located outside of the country which urge nationals abroad to invest in their “homelands.”

In this regard, I explore new alliances and exclusions in the reconfiguration of diasporic linkage. Ultimately, I argue that we have entered a moment in which a new ontology of diasporic theorizing about Africanness and African Americanness is necessary. This moment is as much about the marginality of blackness in the global North as it is about new subject formations allied with global capital being propelled by state actors and their African and Black American collaborators. What we see emerging are new claims to diasporic linkages that have little reverence for or focus on earlier transatlantic movements and are instead concerned with contemporary migrations and the need to create ties to sites of origins and age-old settlements.

These new approaches to diasporic formations, I argue, must take seriously the complexity of simultaneous, and at times inequitable, inclusion and exclusion, formed as new cartographies of power are
redrawn in an effort to facilitate Millennium Development Goals. I first consider more deeply the ways that scholars have framed their studies of diaspora in the past two decades, in relation to the primacy of trans-Atlantic slavery, and what such framings overlook. I then offer two examples of diasporic humanitarianism taking shape in the Global North: the first investigates the use of diasporic language by members of international institutions; the second example, focusing on resource wars in Darfur, details the formation of what might be seen as grassroots mobilizations but which are actually powerful UN forces concerned with the effects of these wars and the establishment of global security mechanisms alongside the rule of law throughout the region. Ultimately, my goal is to advance a reframing of black diasporic formations that rethinks the relationship between diasporas centered on contemporary postcolonial African states and other conceptions of African diasporic linkage whose boundaries exceed, and often precede, the nation-state system itself.

“NEW” SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: DIASPORIC HUMANITARIANISM AND NEW DIASPORIC METAPHORS

In The Souls of Black Folk (1903), W. E. B. DuBois interrogated problems related to the color line and racial hierarchies of difference. In pursuing this issue through his lifetime, it was the African diaspora, not the postcolonial African state that was his central object of study. This focus played a critical role in setting the agenda for studying blackness in the 20th century. Scholars during that period also engaged with the social thought of leaders such as Martin Delany and Marcus Garvey—all interested in various forms of Black nationalism, Pan-African linkages to the peoples of the African continent. But “diaspora” and social uplift from postslavery oppression was their object of interest. Over the past 40 years of scholarship on African diasporic linkages, scholars in the United States and elsewhere have explored histories of race making under conditions of oppression and degradation (Davidson 1980; Lovejoy 2000; Mintz and Price 1976). With that departure—one that has made transatlantic slavery the founding theme of African diaspora theorizing—related scholarship has explored cultural and racial citizenship (Clarke 2004; Gordon 1998), cultural production (Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990, 1996; Holloway 1991; Mintz and Price 1992; Roach 1996) including performance (Brooks 2006; Skinner 1982), esthetics (Kelley 2005; Kelley and Lemelle 1994), identity (Kelley 2005), representation, and subjectivity (Hall 1990, 1996; Malkki 1995; Palmie 2002; Scott 1991), as well problems of nationalism and Pan-Africanism during periods of the early 20th century (Garvey 1915, 1921, 1922; Martin 1976), and religious formations (Clarke 2004; Erskine 2005; Olupona 2008). This trend has emphasized two conceptual arguments. The first is that the notion of the “African diaspora” should be imagined through Black Atlantic forms of redemption from slavery that serve to circumvent the modernity of racial exclusion which has taken root within the nation-state and in global relations (Anderson 1991[1983]; Harris 1996).

The second is the assumption that the politics and relationships of recent African immigrants should be classified differently, since contemporary migrations of Africans to the Americas, Europe, Australia, and Canada have involved voluntariness, and thus differ substantively from the forms of forced migration that led to the expulsion of Africans to the plantations of the Americas. This latter argument underscores the invisibility of contemporary African subgroups in the literature, further reinforcing the forced migration of Black people as the basis upon which the category of “African diaspora” has developed.

My argument is with the first trajectory of diasporic framing—the overemphasis upon trans-Atlantic slavery as the basis for framing diasporic movement—for in an effort to document human suffering as a key modality in the expansion of the West, this focus has privileged slavery in the study of the African diasporic formations in the American academy. This is an argument that, of course, is shared by those scholars conducting research into Black Europe (Brown 2005; Campt 2005; Fikes 2009; Sawyer 2006; Wright 2004). Yet what I am interested in emphasizing here is the need to expand the ways that we identify genealogies of origins and linkage and their implications for understanding contemporary exclusions in the African world.

The popularization of the African diaspora as the product of trans-Atlantic dispersal has come of age through invocation of a similar process among Jews (Safran 1991, 2005). Diaspora, a Greek-derived word that describes the scattering of seeds, was used to illustrate the movement of then Hebrew Israelites as a result of the destruction of the Temple—and, over different moments in history, other forms of Jewish marginalization in the contemporary period (see Brown 2005; Clarke 2004). It is well known that the concept has come of age in black North American and European scholarship, as well as in black identity movements, to highlight the scattering of enslaved Africans transported from Africa to the

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It has been well established by now that the earlier African and African diaspora literature is saturated with oversimplifications of race and diaspora as defined by identity and geographic location (Harris 1982, 1996; Patterson and Kelley 2000). This scholarship focused on trans-Atlantic slavery (Roberts 1999; Thornton 1992) and the flow of people (Patterson and Kelley 2000), goods (Thornton 1992), cultural, religious (Palmie 2002), and linguistic practices—on the presumption that people have been violently uprooted and were in the midst of resettlement.

By the mid-1990s, a new literature on interrogating the African diaspora had, through invoking new metaphors such as the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993; Thompson 1993) or the circum-Atlantic region (Roach 1996), brought the modernity of race, cultural agency, and movement to the center of explorations into subjectivity and citizenship. Recasting the process of modernity through a language of movement, innovation, and difference, this approach, with its necessary interpolation of blackness and emphasis on formations embedded in the Atlantic region, was positioned on a fulcrum of movement and history. As such, this approach makes sense of contemporary diasporic identity by asking the question of what people do rather than who they are.

A range of scholars has moved to explore these African and African American interconnections in relation to various analytic metaphors for the making of diasporic identities. The most recent has been the metaphor Afro-Atlantic dialogues, used by scholars (Harris 1999; Matory 2005; Okediji 1999; Yelvington 2006), to investigate what Randy Matory has posited as the “underexamined mobility and agency of black people in creating this world and the specific role of black consciousness in the creative and historical making of black distinctiveness” (2006:171). As developed in his most recent book, Black Atlantic Religion (2005), Matory explains that there has been a historically constituted relationship of engagement and mutual exchange between Africa and those in diasporic relation to it:

The “dialogue” metaphor would instead highlight the ways in which the mutual gaze between African and African Americans, multidirectional travel and migration between the two hemispheres, the movement of publications, commerce, and so forth, have shaped African and African-American cultures in tandem, over time, and at the same time. It highlights the ways in which cultural artifacts, images, and practices do not simply “survive” or endure through “memory”; they are, rather, interpreted and...
reproduced for diverse contemporary purposes by actors with culturally diverse repertoires, diverse interests, and diverse degrees of power to assert them. (Matory 2006:171)

Although it clearly refers to fifth-, sixth-, and seventh-generation Black Americans, Matory’s invocation underscores diasporic linkages as a dialogic discursive field of production, underscore the ways that these dialogs, be they historical or contemporary, provide “the basis for future transformations” (Yelvington 2006:5). The concept of multidirectional exchange responds critically to earlier scholarship of unidirectional exchange between Africa and its sites of dispersal (Piot 1999), but it fails to accommodate fields of power and knowledge within which contemporary regimes of diasporic formulations are being crafted in uneven exchanges.

As a far-from-equal set of transactions, in which various agents are not always in control of the basis of exchange and production, dialog is relevant in particular contexts in which previously marginalized persons or cultural groups engage in mutual exchanges toward similar or related ends. But it is important that we make sense of a new set of constellations critical to contemporary diasporic formations that are less about “dialogues” and widespread agency, and more about particular hegemonic alliances with powerful global institutions and a form of subject making that is not always crafted by agents themselves.

Given these discursive constellations, how might we rearticulate the forms of diasporic imaginaries and engagements through an actual language of postcolonial governance that reflect the realities of increasing formations in which NGOs and international institutions are just as engaged, and hegemonically so, in subject making?

Thus far, by discussing the language of African diasporas as a product of scholarly debates whose own framework grew out of the history of trans-Atlantic slavery, I have characterized a particular ontology of African diaspora theorizing of the 20th century. Yet as we shall see, the contemporary significance of the popular institutional uses of diaspora discourses finds its roots not in national origins discourses, nor in new kinship alliances and desirous claims to homelands, but in humanitarian interventions where the notion of a people as victims of poverty is accompanied by the knowledge that they are also potential consumers with access to networks of resources and potentialities. The following two examples highlight these new formations.

CONSTRUCTING THE AFRICAN DIASPORA AS A POLITICAL ACT

The contemporary period is one in which United Nations organizations, such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has called on Africans abroad—in the so-called diaspora—to “come together and turn the resource drain into resource gain.” In her October 19, 2006, speech to a high-level Expert Forum on “Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora” at the University for Peace in Toronto, Canada, H. E. Sheikh Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, 1 month into her yearlong presidency of the United Nations General Assembly, spoke of the roles of diasporic communities in economic development around the world. Al Khalifa opened her lecture by emphasizing the historical role of diasporic communities as agents of progress who have made “valuable contributions to the intellectual, scientific, political, economic, and cultural life” in the places where they settle. She underscored the transition of diasporic communities from conflict- and poverty-laden to productive contributors helping to develop their sites of settlement.9 Pointing to the 2005 World Summit at the UN, in which world leaders reaffirmed the “interlinked pillars” of peace and security, human rights, and economic development, and agreed to adopt an ambitious “reform agenda to strengthen the UN in implementing its goals,” she emphasized the intention of such leadership to take necessary steps toward protecting populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

Al Khalifa called on “governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, and the media” to ensure that diasporic communities be provided the education, work opportunities, and possibilities of social engagement to participate constructively in the communities in which they live. Citing the need for “global solutions to global challenges,” she ended by calling for a new “angle from which we view the world.” And affirming her hopes that the “quest for peace and development” might be rearticulated in global terms, because “the ability to shape our world view to reflect the diversity of cultures and needs that exist is the key to success.”

Since the end of World War II, followed by the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the 1991 dismantling of the former Soviet Union, profound changes in the global political and economic order have renewed large movements of people in almost every region of the world. This wave of migrating populations has led to complex trade, technology, and finance networks. Moreover, as migration has proliferated, so too has the formation of diasporic
communities and the number of people with transnational linkages elsewhere and allegiances to multiple hometowns, homelands, and continents. This reformulating economy has developed alongside a characteristic division of labor. Postcolonial countries from the South have been significant in their production of primary goods and cheap labor, whereas Northern and Pacific Rim countries have engaged in industrialization projects as a result of foreign investments by their own as well as multinational corporations (Gordon 1998).

At the same time, while some people are engaged in various forms of movement, others remain settled and, thus, reconstitute group membership in relation to perceived older alliances, all the time rearticulating the basis for such membership and reinforcing group tensions. In Africa, discoveries of oil in places such as Nigeria (1956), and Equatorial Guinea, and new drilling in the Sudan in 2005 have propelled tensions and disparities in national development. For example, in Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony in Africa in which 70 percent of the population list Spanish as their official language, only 7.2 percent of the land is agricultural (permanent crops: 3.57 percent; other: 91.8 percent) is and being shared by half a million people. The median population age is 19, and life expectancy is 49. The fertility rate is 4.48 (making the average number of children born per woman more than four), and U.S. government figures show that there are 10,000 phones (10 percent of households). Yet as a result of the recent oil discoveries and negotiations, Equatorial Guineans now have the fourth highest per capita in the world, after Luxembourg, Bermuda, and Jersey (Massey 1994). By enumerating the ways that new technologies have made it easier for Africans located in the countries of their citizenship and those abroad to benefit from the “knowledge, skills and investment capital of Africans abroad,” many involved with the ECA’s first African Development Forum emphasized the degree of interconnectedness between those differently situated. In this way, many migrants from African countries now living in the Americas and Europe continue to benefit from African forms of identification. In addition, magnifying the relationship between the originary home and the sites of migration, ECA observers point to the ways that diasporic subjects are affected by their country of citizenship’s political struggles or weak bargaining power with international institutions. As a result, members of this UN-sponsored organization have compiled a database of “active diaspora groups” and have culled on those in the “diaspora” to support African struggles by “lobbying, preparing position papers, and monitoring specific trade provisions that work against Africa’s interests.” And today, given the current move by international actors to diversify Africa’s trade partners and to engage in negotiations with those in overseas markets (China, India, and Lebanon, for example), the need to collaborate with African investors is often emphasized. The significant formation is diasporic humanitarianism in which new geopolitical spaces are being engaged through homeland attachments.

DARFUR
In the second example, the call for humanitarian inclusion and diasporic action has taken shape with another form of interconnection—the recent mobilization of the Save Darfur Coalition. As we shall see, in addition to various other competing development models, such as the World Bank, and NGOs, the diasporic humanitarianism that is taking shape represents a shift in new development models in Africa. In this regard, the Save Darfur Coalition is an international organization whose political and economic headquarters is in the United States but whose membership base is international, cross-faith, cross-interest group, and transnational. Clearly distinct from the forces engaged in genocide, its mission is to develop an infrastructure for the elimination of violence in Darfur. Claiming a constituency of thousands of affiliated organizations and over a million members, they have marshaled forces to raise public awareness about the ongoing genocide in Darfur. The coalition’s objectives are articulated through a discourse of diasporic homeland attachments that have been used to channel powerful institutional linkages in range of ways.

On March 4, 2009 the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan on seven charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity. This is the first time the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state. The Prosecutor, in his July 14, 2008 application had requested that genocide be included among the charges, alleging that “President Al Bashir targeted and sought to destroy the Fur, Maslit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the groups’ destruction.” The decision not to include genocide in the warrant was the judges,’ based upon evidence in the case. According to John Washburn, Convener for the American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court, judges determined that the prosecution’s evidence “failed
to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the Government of Sudan acted with specific intent to destroy a group because of its identity.”11 In his informational memorandum addressed to AMICC members, alliances, observers, and friends, Washburn acknowledged that the case “will challenge the ICC and international community.” He closed with the following call to advocacy:

The Bashir case will likely provide new opportunities to explain the ICC and engage our communities about the work of the Court. We encourage you to reach out to Darfur or organizations concerned with atrocities or with particular aspects of them, such as crimes against women, as well as the media to discuss the ICC case. Please let us know if we can provide materials or how we can otherwise help your advocacy.

Attention was the drawn for updates to the AMICC website.

Calls for humanitarian action such as this have been frequent and effective tools used by the Save Darfur Coalition as well. For example, in 2007, it issued a powerful petition to George Bush. As it noted, “Since it began in February 2003, the genocide sponsored by the Sudanese government and perpetrated by its Janjaweed militias has claimed at least 400,000 lives, displaced 2.5 million people and left >3.5 million men, women and children struggling to survive amid violence and starvation.”

It is clearly evident that diaspora—a used in its contemporary articulation—reflects a state of interconnection to histories of affiliation; but it points to a set of dispositions in which global membership and privilege is possible within this space of alliance. In the Sudan—at 2.5 million square kilometers the largest country in Africa—an estimated 39.4 million people13 are divided among 19 major ethnic groups and collectively speak more than a 100 different languages and dialects. At the first census in 1956, 39 percent self-identified as Arabs and 61 percent Black—the largest group of the country’s population. Seventy percent of the country is Muslim and continue to occupy the northern two-thirds of the country. The remaining African non-Muslim citizens live in the south and have been marginalized by the country’s Muslim elite since independence in 1956. The discovery of oil in Sudan’s southern region has propelled ongoing conflict that has led to extreme losses of life.

Darfurians and the Sudanese south in general have been engaged in struggles over autonomy since the European amalgamation of the Sudanese state. Some of these tensions have further reinforced autochthonous claims to land, resulting in violence for most of its years of independence, and have led to the complicated ways in which group alliances and community—including diasporic linkage—is constituted in that region. The historical conflicts between the northern ruling elite and the disenfranchised south, the struggles over autonomy and difference, have meant that any diasporic claims to the people of the state are to particular constituencies rather than to the whole. Given the mutability of these linkages and the many diasporic claims made, the context of diasporic formations and the ways in which new and relevant coalitions are deployed are of increasing importance.

Between 1969 and 1985 the Sudan country was controlled by the military government of Jafa’ar Nimeiri. In order to develop oil resources, Nimeiri put in place a two-pronged strategy to divide and displace the southern population. Effected over the course of two decades, this entailed the displacement of southern agro-pastoralists and the murder and capture of those who resisted. A range of events such as the revival of the old Sharia Islamic code and militarization of resource-rich areas led to struggles over the control of southern land and the clearing out particularly of Nuer and Dinka people to the south and the east by Arabic-speaking armed militias. Land, schools, and livelihood were destroyed, and whole communities separated (Deng 1995; Lesch 1998; Scroggins 2002)

By 1989, an Islamist-military government had taken power, determined to develop further Sudanese oil potential. Before continuing their investments, oil companies demanded signals of the government’s willingness to settle the violence with its competing Nuer and Dinka populations. The Nuer were known to be the key ethnic grouping with regard to the oil development issues, because their land encompassed the oil basins. Through negotiations, the Nuer lobbied for independence, which was concretized with the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997. However, with the development of democratic realignments and public reallocations of resources, fighting recommenced. Initially, the public narrative concerning this violence was that it was “interfac- tional” fighting between southerners. But soon, another explanation emerged: particular groups such as government supported militia groups known as Janjaweed were providing arms and ammunition to progovernment militias to combat antigovernment forces (Deng 1995; Lesch 1998; Scroggins 2002).

In 1999, with the fighting continuing, the Sudanese army began to displace more Dinkas who resided in oilfield areas. These government militia
forces engaged in widespread displacement measures, often resorting to violence. Oil extractions continued alongside this offensive; but what also grew was a new alliance of radical antigovernment Nuer troops known as the Upper Nile Provisional Military Command Council, who brokered arms deals for their own cause and declared that the government had abrogated the Khartoum Peace Agreement (Deng 1995; Rone 2003: 44–45). What followed was a series of struggles between the then Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) subgroup of the Sudan Liberation Movement, negotiations, and ongoing forms of displacements that resulted in the February 2001 standstill agreement and peace covenant. Nevertheless, the UN special rapporteur on Sudan advised the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2002 that the human rights situation in the region had still not improved. As he indicated, “oil exploitation is closely linked to the conflict which . . . is mainly a war for the control of resources and, thus, power.” Baum added that “oil has seriously exacerbated the conflict while deteriorating the overall situation of human rights,” and noted he had heard that “oil exploitation is continuing to cause widespread displacement.”

By 2002, the Sudanese government was said to be generating enough income from oil revenues to support a domestic arms industry. It purchased new attack helicopters in two years and bought various arms from abroad that enabled it to deploy its Janjaweed (tribal, equestrian) militias not only to target and clear populations, but also to secure the next oil concession area as well (Rone 2003).

Interestingly, information about conflicts such as Darfur are heavily mediated through various humanitarian organizations working with NGOs and various human rights organizations. One such group is the International Crisis Group (ICG), which has been heavily engaged in onsite reporting and the formation and expansion of similarly positioned organizations have been commensurate with the influx and circulation of information in the region. As of February 2003, the ICG described the violence in Darfur as emerging as a direct result of the attacks on Darfurian, as well as associated Massalit, and Zaghawa, civilian groups by government forces and the Janjaweed. The tactics have ranged from systematic attacks against villages to the burning of crops, buildings, arbitrary killings, rape, and looting. The government of the Sudan has allegedly used aerial bombardments claiming they are attacking all those “harboring SLM/A or JEM terrorist forces.” An accumulation of war crimes, crimes against humanity are expressed in the arrest warrant of Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan on March 4, 2009. This case will spark much international debate, especially about the extent to which humanitarian intervention through international adjudication of one commander is the most effective way to address widespread violence committed by many. At the center for this debate are various humanitarian organizations and NGOs working alongside donors to provide extragovernmental support to various failed states. By engaging in widespread actions with powerful international organizations, including >180 faith-based, advocacy, and humanitarian organizations, The Save Darfur Coalition organizers has been able to turn world attention to the suffering and alleged forms of discrimination by those characterized locally as “Arab” (i.e., herder) Sudanese against others seen as “African” (i.e., farmer) Sudanese, though both are Black. The most critical focus of this outreach has been on what is being referred to as the leaders of the worldwide Darfuri diaspora. By forming alliances with those who have become Sudanese refugees in the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, this organization—already embedded in the language of institutional power—has allied with decision and policy makers and engaged members of the UN Security Council to work toward ending the genocide in Darfur. Thus far, they have succeeded in working with the Security Council to impose economic sanctions, and they are centrally involved in U.S. congressional lobbying of American policy makers to provide adequate funding for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts in the region.

Letter writing and petition circulation are also key mechanisms for support and community formation—the decarmation of community. Save Darfur has thus been engaged in a letter-writing campaign targeted not only to undermine presumptions of national sovereignty by ousting the current Sudanese president, but also to call on the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC to follow through on indictments issued for two alleged Sudanese war criminals who are suspected of orchestrating systematic campaigns of rape as a tool of war.

The letter excerpted below, dated May 18, 2007, highlights the significant appeals and the types of diasporic community-building strategy that are being deployed to lend legitimacy to the humanitarian cause:

We, the undersigned, representatives of civil society groups from Darfur in the diaspora, are writing to urge you to take immediate and effective
action to end the systematic ethnic cleansing and
organized war crimes and crimes against humanity
that have been perpetrated by the Government of
Sudan (GoS) and its proxy Janjaweed militia
against our people since the spring of 2003.

In August of 2006, on the eve of the UN Security
Council discussion on Darfur that produced
Resolution 1706/2006, many of us conveyed the
same important message to Secretary-General
Kofi Annan with a set of specific demands. We
also wrote to Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
in January of 2007, asking him to make Darfur
one of his top priorities in the first days of his
tenure. As we have sought from many of your
governments individually, we requested at the
time that, in addition to the deployment of a UN
peacekeeping force in Darfur, that [sic] the UN
in cooperation with the African Union undertakethe every proactive measure to reinvigorate the
political negotiations in order to reach a just and
sustainable political solution and ultimately
peace in the country, et cetera.17

After listing their demands for action—deploying
a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur, disarming
the Janjaweed militia, addressing the concerns of
displaced persons, supporting Darfuri rebels in
adopting a “unified negotiating position,” ensuring
the Sudanese government’s compliance with the
ICC, and allowing the UN mission to arrest and
hand over suspected war criminals—the authors,
clearly versed in NGO mobilization strategies,
closed the letter thus:

We, as Darfurians who have been provided ref-
ugee [sic] and safety in many of your countries,
ask with all urgency that the Security Council
takes every action necessary to end the incalcul-
able suffering of our people. A unified and
decisive commitment from this body can save
the lives of our peoples, relatives and friends and
spare them the wrath of the ongoing campaign
of ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.18

This campaign has gained traction and has led
to the establishment of UN Security Council san-
tions and deployment of troops in the region. The
significance, however, is that the basis for legitimacy
of this group, though comprising a group of people
from the Sudan—some of whom are refugees and
have taken citizenship in other places—is created
through the language not only of “civil society” but
also that of the “Darfuri diaspora.” The invocation
of diaspora here reflects a discourse of humanitari-
anism that in many ways forecloses dialog. It impels
us to help, and to help on no uncertain terms. It in-
structs us that the only way to help is through
international intervention, and only through those
means will “incalculable suffering” be redressed
(also see Fadlalla 2008; Mamdani 2009).

The mobilization of other forces, such as the
International Criminal Court, international NGOs,
and other supportive human rights activists, led to
the UN Security Council’s intervention into Darfur
and the redeployment of forces in the region. Here, it
is not national sovereignty that is of concern to the
writers and signers of the letter. It is the alleged vio-
lence and the prospect of continuing violence that is
of concern. The constructed legitimacy of humani-
tarian redress, like the constructed legitimacy of
poverty alleviation of the UN goals, is central to the
mechanisms of diaspora making in these contexts.

Ultimately, this contemporary use of the word
diaspora by those interested in the development of
the African continent does not necessarily locate the
African diaspora as a place or a set of territorial
places embedded in the modernity of black Atlantic
histories. Like the concept of “the West,” it exists
in the social imaginary and within the cartographies
of struggle, and new allegiances in relation to a post-
cold war period linked to increased African violence.
Those who invoke it do so by complicating straight-
forward allegiances to a given nation-state.
However, the various examples presented here also
mark the existence of people around the world who
are marginalized on the basis of their ethnic and or
racial histories but whose struggles to live are con-
ected to a new militarization of postcolonial
African states in which the fall of the Soviet Union
was directly connected to a new era of violence in
various African postcolonies. In the case of the
widespread movement of large numbers of Darfur-
ians in Toronto, New York, Washington, DC, London,
etc., the term diaspora is being invoked as
an appeal to an alternate grouping of those in exile
whose claims are not to the Sudanese government
but to Darfurians in diasporic exile.

With the identification of a nation within a state,
the Darfuri appeal is to the freedom of those
marginalized by the state. What we see are institu-
tional and transnational attempts to make diasporic
linkages through new ontologies of inclusion and le-
gitimization, to use the tools of the state power,
democracy, and rights language in an effort to pro-
duce the voice of the people—regardless of state
citizenship. In this case, these discursive maneuvers
represent attempts to use fictions of linkage to make

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viable connections where they might be differently constituted in relation to other forms of connection.

In *Specters of Marx*, Jacques Derrida (1992) introduces the concept of spectrality to disrupt notions of ontological presence and linear notions of history—the “specter” being that of the past, returning contingently and repeatedly in new guises and incarnations, which we must in some way learn to recognize and live with. Elsewhere (Derrida 1994) he writes of cohabitations—haunted houses—where different specters uneasily appear and reappear. This is a way of talking about how the present is always haunted by an unsettling past and thus never exists unto itself; rather, it is always present alongside that which precedes it. Here we see that the specters of diasporic linkage that exist in the world today represent the ghosts of trans-Atlantic slavery indeed—that is, capitalist economic modernity that sits as an extension of the plunder of contemporary Africa that is ongoing today. Yet today the sign of African alliance is more elusive than ever before and extends well beyond histories of slavery. In some cases, it is conditions of poverty alongside extreme wealth, the realities of failed postcolonial states indebted to international lenders, and the growing dependence on international economic development that are characterizing the new deployment of African diasporas (Cohen 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Miles 2004; Orozco 2004; Russell 1986; Sassen 2001; Taylor 1999; Wood and McCoy 1985).

With the reorganization of international spheres of governance, the development of structural adjustment programs that have devastated African economies, the reliance on international money-lending institutions, and membership in international treaty regimes, African postcolonial states are characterized in different forms of brokering (Cohen 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Miles 2004; Orozco 2004; Russell 1986; Sassen 2001; Taylor 1999; Wood and McCoy 1985). Thus, the politics of settlement at times, movement at other times, highlights the complexity of linkage. Neither blackness nor the absence of migratory choice is the basis for diasporic forms of identification; neither violence nor ethnicity alone is at the heart of dispersal. At times it is war, of course; but at times it is environmental degradation, power abuses, NGO formations, development opportunities, ethnic genocide, or institutional realignments. At times it is desires to lay claim to the West and its resources—to have the ability either to go and come at will or to maintain alliances with kin who send money back home. Sometimes it is the ability to adapt practices from elsewhere and to bring them into being through particular tools of contemporary power. However, the key is to recognize the difference as that of new regimes of supranational governance that are being empowered to remake new linkages in ways that cross-cut those of earlier trans-Atlantic routes. This formation does not reflect dialog of connection or negotiation. It has produced a subjectivity in the international imagination in which the state postcolonial African and new supranational spheres of governance have both a chilling presence (NGO governmentality, international legal institutions over sovereignty), yet an absence from certain public spheres (public services, adequate government assistance, and housing for the poor). Its presence is represented in the symbolic figure of the African indigent man, woman, or child to be saved from poverty or violence by powerful transnational mobilizations. Its absence is in its nondialogic participation in terms of social change.

**CONCLUSION**

In their attempt to recast the relevance of the formation of “a new African Diaspora,” Isidore Okpewho, Carole Boyce Davies, and Ali A. Mazrui asked scholars to interrogate the meaning of diaspora in terms that include alternate formations. Resulting in the 1999 publication of *The African Diaspora: African Origins and the New World Identities*, this call for inclusion was a call for a new form of membership. This new realignment however, does not necessarily involve the reconceptualization of diaspora. Rather, Isidore Okpewho (1999), among other collaborators, is concerned with the formation of new African immigrants in the African American diasporic landscape. Yet, like UN and new business negotiations, Okpewho reappropriates the same overly subscribed category of diaspora in order to resignify these “New World identities” (Keynote Address, 2006). This usage of *diaspora* is applied with a renewed vengeance, but it is doing a different kind of work: In this case, *diaspora* is being invoked as a statement of inclusion as a result of a new and significant migration pattern that has actually led to the changing face of the American academy, one in which first-generation American sons and daughters of African immigrants are entering American universities and community colleges alongside second- and third-generation Caribbean Blacks, as well as sixth- and seventh-generation American Blacks. These patterns of integration and participation highlight the changing face of African American membership and the necessary reconceptualizations of the use-value of the African diaspora. For what we are seeing is a certain diasporic formation that has its roots in very different paths of linkage and
engagements with Africa but that come together within the specter of contemporary capitalist plunder in a post-cold war era.

As I have shown, there are different links between earlier deployments of the African diaspora and contemporary formations of diasporic humanitarianism. This move has implications for the way social science scholarship approaches the study of these emergent formations and how studies that map new black diasporic ontologies define the existence of new formations. For unless African American diasporic cultural production is understood in relation to contemporary issues on the African continent, the signifier of Africa in the African Diaspora will remain an insignificant symbol of African realities, always present in its invocation of African American identities, but absent in the continuing trajectories of plunder in postcolonial Africa.

Whether diasporic articulations are produced as a result of a consciousness from forced migration, indentured labor, migrant poverty, or violence, the complexities of power are such that it is important to parse the workings of contemporary institutions of power that go well beyond the racial imaginary to rethink both the social and political histories of these formations in relation to the ways that particular practices move from discourses of marginality, slavery, and powerlessness to discourses embedded in new international fields of power.

In the advent of humanitarian diasporas, one of the questions to be answered is: what does the powerful emergence of a new language of diaspora being advanced as a category of neoliberal governance suggest about the mutability of the symbolic uses of diaspora? In many ways, the example of humanitarian diasporas highlights an oversight in contemporary diasporic thinking, while it also points to new UN and the World Bank economic alliances with places seen as “homelands” as a way to engage in new capitalist development possibilities.

By examining these humanitarian approaches to diaspora as they are being institutionally revived, I have been interested in making explicit another contemporary diasporic formation, not through genealogies of slavery and the consequent dispersal of African captives ever-present in earlier diasporic scholarly and grassroots models, but through examining the extraordinariness of new diasporic formations that are emerging with significantly powerful state and suprastate support. This is the direction that the practice of diasporic subject making is moving in the 21st century. The reality of these new engagements requires us to rethink the language of “dialogue” and the fulcrum of trans-Atlantic slavery. For in increasingly sociopolitical contexts, it is not a new diaspora through the absence of the state that is bringing “new” diasporic configurations into play, but the presence of new realities in postcolonial states, spheres of marginality and underdevelopment, as well as these their negotiated alliances with various humanitarian organizations. Thus, by delinking the “African diaspora” from histories of forced migration and expressing it in terms of the rethinking of the slave trade as the basis for articulating black linkages, I have suggested that we move to explore parallel diasporic spaces that are at the frontiers of contemporary events. In this case it is new spaces of diasporic linkage being upheld by policy makers and international institutions that beg for attention within the corpus of black diasporic transnational thinking.

NOTES
1. I thank the anonymous reviewers for their input and the many colleagues with whom I have been in conversation in the writing and review of this piece: Jackie Brown, Percy Hintzen, Bayo Holsey, Mihr Cakir Inal, Richard Iton, Hudita Mustafa, Jacob Olupona, Ato Quayson, Jean Rahier, Ariana Hernandez-Reguant, Deborah Thomas, Allisa Trotz, Rinaldo Walcott, Michelle Wright, Kevin Yelvington, and Paul Zeleza.
6. Only later in the life of W. E. B. DuBois did Africa become key to his understanding of racial disenfranchisement. Then it was coloniality and postcoloniality that featured critical to his understandings of oppression through the workings of race, class, and imperialism.
7. Interestingly, shifts in recent humanitarian discourses also employ suffering narratives and forms. See Veena Das (2001) for discussion about suffering narratives, inclusion, and exclusion.
8. Lorna Davidson, “Connecting with the African Diaspora,” Africa Recovery 13.4 (December
The Western Upper Nile region was traditionally the homeland of the Nuer people—a group placed on the sociocultural map by Evans-Pritchard (1940) and later revisited by Sharon Hutchinson (1996), among others. Today, the main area of oil production and prospecting stretches southeast across the Sudanese state’s midsection, directly past the Western Upper Nile of the Nuer and through the lower southern region. Although petroleum exploration had begun in the Sudan in the 1960s, it was not until 1978 that oil was found in the town of Bentiu, some seven hundred and fifty kilometers southwest of Khartoum. Embedded in related resource struggles has been the most recent struggles in the Western Sudan region known as Darfur, bordering Chad, the Central African Republic and Libya, and once ruled by an independent and unencumbered Sudan, this region was amalgamated into Sudan and of late, the various regional displacements from Ethiopia and Chad has led to an increase in large numbers of refugees from the Western borders.


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Taylor, J. Edwards

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Thompson, Robert Farris

Thornton, John

Töölyan, Khachig

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Yelvington, Kevin A.

Wood, Charles, and Terry McCoy

Williams, Eric

Wright, Michelle M.

Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe
APPENDIX 1: DARFUR DIASPORIC SIGNATORIES TO LETTER OF MAY 18, 2007

Darfur Association of Canada, Ismail Adam, president
Darfur Call (the Netherlands), Ahmed M. Mohamedain, managing director, Human Rights and Advocacy
Darfur Community Association of Australia, Abdelhadi Matar, president
Darfuri Diaspora Association of East Africa, Niemat Ahmadi, programs coordinator
Darfur Peace and Justice Organization (Belgium), Mohmadain Mohmad Eshak, president
Darfur People's Association in Belgium, Abdel-Rahaman Adriss, president
Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (Switzerland), Abdelbagi Jibreel, executive director
Fur Association Europe, Idris Husaballa, chairman
Union of the People of Darfur in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Ishag Mekki, vice chairman

Darfuri Leaders Network (United States), Consisting of:
Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy, Mohamed Yahya, executive director
Darfur Alert Coalition, Ibrahim Hamid, treasurer
Darfur Association in the United States, Mahmoud Braima, president
Darfur Association of Alabama, Eman Eldin, secretary general
Darfur Association of Colorado, Ahmed Adam Ali, secretary general
Darfur Association of Illinois, Mohamed Abdel Rahman, secretary general
Darfur Association of Nebraska, Adam Omar
Darfur Association of Texas, Bashir Gamous Abdulrasoul, branch leader
Darfur Community Organization (Nebraska), Bakheit Shata, executive director
Darfur Human Rights Organization of the U.S., Elgasim Salih, vice president
Darfur Peace and Development Organization, Suliman Giddo, president
Darfur People's Association of Iowa, Anwar Elnour, president
Darfur People's Association of New York, Motasim Adam, president
Darfur People's Union (Washington, DC), Bashir M. Ishag, president
Darfur Rehabilitation Project, Inc., Elnour Adam, projects director
Fur Association of North America, Ishag Ahmed, president
Fur Cultural Revival, Mansour Ahmed, secretary general
Western Sudan Aid Relief in the U.S., Abdeljabbar Seddik, president

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